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Contact: kristoffer@klevjer.no. Abstract: Humans are aversive to risk (irreducible 
uncertainty) and ambiguity (reducible uncertainty). However, strong ambiguity aversion does 
not necessarily imply strong risk aversion. Further, in real life it can be challenging to 
attribute uncertainty and one may treat ambiguity as risk. This can lead to biases in 
information sampling, i.e. premature stopping of collecting information that could reduce 
uncertainty. These biases in information sampling have also been linked to delusional 
thinking and hallucination disposition in both healthy individuals as well as in mental 
disorders like schizophrenia. Modelling allows to identify the processes and aberrances in 
decision-making. Here, we experimentally investigate these potentially aberrant attributions 
by using the draws to decision version of the beads task (Huq et al., 1988) and the risk and 
ambiguity lottery task (Levy et al., 2010). For each participant (N=77) we extracted their 
risk-, and ambiguity aversion using the hierarchical Bayesian modelling of Decision-Making 
tasks R-package (hBayesDM; Woo-Young et al., 2017), and used those parameters as 
predictors for explaining the draws to decision in the beads-task. Preliminary results indicate 
that a person’s risk aversion but not ambiguity aversion is related to draws to decision in the 
beads task. This displays both the usefulness and importance of modelling cognitive tasks to 
better understand and analyze the results from decision-making tasks, as well as its 
importance in order to better understand and disentangle the underlying mechanisms of 
everyday biases. 
 
 
 
